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The European debt crisis has impacted on electoral politics in most European states, but
particularly in the Republic of Ireland. The severe nature of the economic crash and the
subsequent application of austerity policies have brought large fluctuations in political
support levels, with the three parties that have dominated the state since its foundation e
Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour e all being adversely effected. The extent of these
changes is highly controlled both by geography and by class, with political allegiances
proving to be highly fluid in certain parts of the state. Growing support levels for left wing
parties and groupings, but most notably Sinn Fein, appear to be moving Irish politics away
from the old “Civil War” style of politics and bringing it more into line with the traditional
class cleavage politics of continental Europe.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.The economic “crash” of 2008 has resulted in a long
period of recession and austerity policies in the Republic
of Ireland, which has had profound impacts for the Irish
political system as well as for economic and social life
within the state. Economic austerity policies have resha-
ped political support patterns in other European states
during this time period, with a growing fragmentation of
party systems evident, for instance, in states such as Italy
(Di Virgilio and Giannetti, 2014) and The Netherlands (Van
Holsteyn, 2014). This trend has been counterpointed by a
tendency for governments to be formed from the tradi-
tionally most dominant parties within those states, as seen
in recent Italian, Dutch and German examples (Mader,
2014), although Syriza's victory in the Greek election of
January 2015 offers an example of a new, anti-austerity,
party taking power. While government parties havesuffered electoral setbacks in most European states during
this period (with the Christian Democrats in Germany
proving to be a notable exception), these trends has been
particularly evident in the more peripheral states within
the European Union (Chari, 2013).
Electoral trends in the Republic of Ireland havemirrored
those of other European countries during this period.
However, the extent of these changes has been particularly
intense in Ireland and threatens to produce the most sig-
nificant change to the political system since the foundation
of the state in 1921. These changes may bring the Irish
political system, where the effect of the traditional class
cleavage has been relatively muted for much of the state's
history, more into line with its European counterparts, at a
point in timewhen the rise of right-wing populist parties is
further undermining the class cleavage in other European
states. At the heart of such developments lies a major
change in terms of the class composition of support pat-
terns for Irish political parties. This paper will review these
changing support trends and assess whether these are
pointing to the emergence of a “new politics” in the Re-
public of Ireland. But this paper will first discuss the nature
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political developments.
1. The Irish political system and party competition
As opposed to the List systems favoured by most states
employing proportional electoral systems, the proportional
element in Ireland's single transferable vote (PR-STV)
electoral system is based on preferential voting and multi-
member constituencies. In this system, voters can give
preferences to all of the candidates running in a constitu-
ency, or as many as they want. To win a seat in an Irish
election, a candidate needs to reach a “quota” at some stage
in the series of “long counts” that determine who fills the
seats at these elections, or else be one of the last candidates
left in the race after all other challengers have been elimi-
nated from the contest. The quota is the smallest number of
votes that can be reached only by a sufficient number of
candidates to fill the number of seats on offer in a particular
constituency contest. If a voter's preferred candidate is
eliminated at any stage during these counts, this vote will
be transferred to the next highest preference amongst the
candidates still remaining in contention for a seat. If a
candidate exceeds the quota (and is deemed elected) dur-
ing the counts, then their “surplus” votes (the number of
votes by which they exceed the quota) will also be trans-
ferred amongst the candidates still remaining in the race.
Lower preferences can significantly dictate the outcome
of election contests in the Republic of Ireland, but vote
transfers tend to favour certain types of candidates and
parties. Party loyalties often shape these vote transfer
patterns, with transfers tending to go to candidates from
the same party, although local factors and the effect of
personality tend to have a greater bearing on transfer
patterns when it comes to second-order election contests,
such as local and European elections. Larger parties tend to
win a high number of vote transfers as their candidates
tend to remain in contention for seats for longer than
candidates from the smaller parties do. Certain parties tend
to be “transfer-friendly” (attracting high levels of vote
transfers), as was the case with the Green Party before
entering government in 2007, or “transfer-toxic” (attracting
low levels of transfer votes), as is the case with Sinn Fein.
The extent to which parties are “transfer-friendly” or
“transfer-toxic” does vary across time, however. In certain
circumstances, parties may be more transfer-toxic than
normal, as was the case with Fianna Fail and the Green
Party at the 2011 General Election.
The degree to which Irish electoral contests are pro-
portional is largely determined by district magnitude
levels, with contests tending to be less proportional in
constituencies that have smaller number of seats appor-
tioned to them (i.e. three-seat constituencies). In a three
seat constituency, a candidate will need to win 25.0% of the
valid poll to reach the quota, but a candidate in a ten-seat
constituency will only need to reach 9.1% of the vote to
exceed the quota. The relatively high proportion of three-
seat constituencies for Irish general election contests
means that these tend not to be as proportional as contests
associated with List systems. However, the absence of a
national or regional threshold in this electoral systemmeans that smaller parties and independent candidates do
have a chance of winning representation in this electoral
system. Smaller parties can only expect to be successful in
their strongest areas, or else in constituencies with very
high district magnitude levels. The larger parties and the
more “transfer-friendly” parties tend to get “seat bonuses”
at most electoral contests. For instance, the largest party at
the 2011 General Election, Fine Gael, won 36.1% of the first
preference votes, but took 45.8% of the seats in the Irish
parliament (Dail Eireann).
Whyte (1974) portrayed Irish politics as lacking social
bases. This over-simplifies the nature of party politics in the
Republic of Ireland somewhat, but the political system has
lacked the strong cleavage between left-wing and right-
wing political parties that characterised politics in most
other European states. (In a similar vein to the United States
of America, however, the limited class basis to party sup-
port patterns in the Republic of Ireland prompted a very
strong class dimension to voter turnout patterns, particu-
larly in the more urban areas (Kavanagh, 2002).) The Irish
party system has been dominated by two centrist, or
centre-right, political parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael.
These parties emerged out of the opposing factions within
the main political division, or cleavage, within Irish politics
in the early 1920s, namely the Civil War. The largest left-
wing party in the state, the Labour Party, generally won a
much smaller share of the vote than that won by these
“Civil War parties”. As Fig. 1 shows, these “Civil War
parties” won at least two-thirds of the votes cast at all
general election contests up to 2011, with their combined
share of the vote having exceeded the eighty percent level
across the period between 1965 and 1982. In what would
effectively amount to a “two and a half party” system, once
Labour Party support levels were also included, there was
little scope left for smaller parties to make any major, or
sustained, breakthrough. This scope for smaller parties to
develop was further limited by the strength of independent
candidates, who often accounted for a large proportion of
the votes that were not taken by the three larger parties.
Fianna Fail was the largest party in the state between
the early 1930s and the onset of the economic crisis in
2008, being effectively established as the “natural party of
government” over this period (Coleman, 2007: 203). The
party was out of government for only twelve full years
between the general elections of 1932 and 2011. The elec-
toral strength of Fianna Fail was largely based on its ability
to portray itself as a “catch-all party”, which could win
relatively high support levels across all areas and all social
groups within the state. The party traditionally won its
highest support levels in the more rural areas and partic-
ularly from areas characterised as having higher pro-
portions of Gaelic speakers, Catholics and small farmers.
But Fianna Fail also succeeded in carving out a significant
support base amongst the urban middle classes, while the
party also created a large support base amongst the urban
working class in the years after its foundation (Sinnott,
1995). By the 1930s Fianna Fail was attracting the highest
level of support from urban working class voters and it
would effectively hold this position of dominance amongst
the urbanworking class electorate until the 2009 Local and
European Elections.
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Fig. 1. Combined share of the vote won in Irish general elections between 1923 and 2011 (as well as the 2014 Local Elections) by Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour.
(1923 Fianna Fail figure is for the Republicans, 1923e1933 Fine Gael figures are for Cumann na nGaedhal.) The support figures used in this chart for more recent
elections (after 1992) were based on the author's own researches, while data for earlier elections were drawn from Sinnott (1995).
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particularly in areas with a higher level of large farmers)
and middle class urban areas, but their support levels were
generally lower in working class urban communities and
hence Fine Gael never succeeded in mirroring the “catch-
all” nature of Fianna Fail support, even at the 2011 General
Election. Fianna Fail strength amongst the urban working
class limited the Labour Party's potential for development,
thus militating against the emergence of a strong class
cleavage within Irish politics. In the earlier part of the
Twentieth Century Labour proved to be highly dependent
on support from the rural working classes, or the agricul-
tural labourer class, while the party's fortunes in Dublin
fluctuated notably. A merger with the more left-wing
Democratic Left party in 1999 did, however, lead to Dub-
lin becoming the party's strongest region during the 2000s,
at a point in time when Sinn Fein was also emerging as a
significant challenger for the urban working class vote.
As noted above, the two and a half party system left
little political space for other political parties to inhabit.
Some “minor parties” (Weeks and Clark, 2012) did achieve
notable degrees of success in their initial electoral outings,
as with the Farmers Party in the 1920s, the Centre Party at
the 1933 election, Clann na Poblachta in the late 1940s and
the Progressive Democrats and Democratic Left in the
1980s and 1990s. The initial gains made by these partiestended to be limited to specific areas or social groups
within the state, however, and their support levels were
never sustained across more than a handful of electoral
contests. These minor parties eventually tended to disband
or be subsumed within one of the existing larger parties.
This is a fate that is unlikely to befall two of the main
challengers to the established parties in the present
context, however. Being part of a wider global environ-
mentalist movement that does not see electoral success as
a virtue in itself, the Green Party is unlikely to disband or
join with another political grouping, despite its electoral
setbacks in 2009 and 2011. However, the party's electoral
appeal remains quite limited within the Republic of Ireland,
with their main support base being mainly drawn from
middle class Dublin areas.
The second of these parties, Sinn Fein, however offers a
more potent challenge to the political establishment. Sinn
Fein's roots are deeper than those of the other minor
parties. It is by no means a “new party”, having been
founded by Arthur Griffith in 1905, and both Fianna Fail and
Fine Gael emerged out of splits within that party during the
early 1920s. Following the defeat of the Anti-Treaty forces
in the 1922e23 Civil War, Sinn Fein, in alliance with the
Irish Republican Army (IRA), took an abstentionist
approach to electoral politics, both in the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland, over the following six
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tions until the emergence of the “armalite and ballot box”
strategy in the early 1980s, which came in the wake of a
number of election victories for H-Block Hunger Strike
candidates at the 1981 elections. The start of the Northern
Ireland Peace Process in 1994 sparked a further period of
growth in Sinn Fein support levels. With a left wing polit-
ical philosophy now shaping party policy, Sinn Fein could
now draw support fromworking class voters, in addition to
those who supported the party on a nationalist basis.
Much of Sinn Fein's initial electoral successes were
focused on Northern Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s and
limited progress was made in the Republic of Ireland until
the late 1990s, with the exception of a number of seat gains
at council elections. Caoimhghín O Caolain won a seat for
Sinn Fein in the Cavan-Monaghan constituency at the 1997
General Election and this lead to a period of growth in party
support levels, with the mobilising of long term non-voters
in low turnout, working class communities forming a key
focus on the party's electoral strategy. Electoral successes at
the 2002 General Election and 2004 Local and European
Elections were, however, followed by a setback at the 2007
General Election and a poor result in Dublin at the 2009
Local and European elections. However, the changed polit-
ical landscapewith the onset of the recession in 2008would
provide fertile ground for a further surge in Sinn Fein
growth levels in the immediate lead up to the 2011 General
Election and particularly in the years following that contest.2. Institutional change in post-crash Ireland
The onset of the economic crisis in 2008marked the end
of a long period of Fianna Fail hegemony. The implications
of this, as related to changing political support patterns,
will be discussed in more detail in the next section. The
economic shock also prompted a drive to reform the Irish
political system. The most notable institutional changes
involved a reduction in the number of elected representa-
tives, both at the national and local levels, the most wide-
spread amendments to electoral boundaries for a number
of decades, the introduction of a gender quota for general
election contests and a significant restructuring of local
authority structures. The political reform measures intro-
duced by the new Fine Gael-Labour government aimed to
make the political system better fit to forestall future eco-
nomic and political crises. These also acted as a means of
reducing expenditure levels relating to the political system,
as a means of showing the Irish public that politicians were
also willing to “feel the pain” of austerity measures.
At the national level, seat numbers in Dail Eireann (the
lower, and most powerful, house within the Irish parlia-
ment) were reduced from 166 to 158. This has significantly
increased the potential for internal conflict amongst the
larger parties, especially with the newly introduced gender
quota legislation requiring political parties to run more
female candidates at the next general election (Kavanagh,
2014a). The government also put forward a referendum
to abolish the upper house of the Irish parliament, Seanad
Eireann, but this was narrowly rejected (by a 51.7%e48.3%
margin) in a low turnout contest in October 2013.At the regional level, the number of local authorities at
the county or city level was reduced with some of these
being amalgamated, while Borough and Town Councils, the
lowest level of electoral democracy in the Irish political
system, were abolished. This significantly reduced local
representative levels across the state, given that there had
been 744 Borough and Town Councillors, although this was
offset somewhat by a slight increase in the number of City
and County Council seats (from 883 to 949). There was a
further rebalancing of City and County Council seat
numbers as part of the reforms to narrow the degree of
variance existing between urban and rural councils in
terms of population per councillor numbers. This resulted
in increased representation levels on local authorities in
Dublin, but brought about a further reduction in local
representation levels in the more rural and less populous
counties. With the number of incumbents now out-
stripping seat levels in some rural constituencies and with
a number of outgoing Borough or Town Councillors also
seeking to remain in representative politics, there were
high levels of competition in terms of party selection pro-
cesses in rural areas in the lead up to the 2014 elections. By
contrast, the increased number of seats in Dublin created
opportunity spaces for new candidates and particularly for
younger candidates and for female candidates.
There was also an increase in the average number of
seats per local election constituency from a range of be-
tween three and seven seats to a range of between six to ten
seats. These changes brought about a notable increase in the
territories of local election constituencies in the more rural
areas, with the largest of these constituencies, the South
and West Kerry electoral area, covering an area of
2514.8 km2. Larger constituency units offered logistical
challenges to the candidates, over and above those that had
been faced in previous local election contests. However, the
increased seat allocations per constituencyoffered scope for
new candidates, who in the past would have been blocked
from contesting elections by long-standing incumbents in
the smaller (three-seat or four-seat) constituency units. This
undoubtedly played a role in the increased number of new
female local election candidates. This trend of larger con-
stituency units was alsomirrored at the European level. The
number of seats allocated to the Republic of Ireland in the
European Parliament was reduced from 12 to 11 after
Croatia joined the European Union in 2013, necessitating a
radical amendment to the European Parliament constitu-
ency boundaries. One of the three new constituencies,
Midlands-North-West, covered an area of 37,286.6 km2
(53.1% of the state territory), which was larger than the
territory covered by five European Union states; Belgium,
Slovenia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta.
3. The elections of 2011 and 2014: “Earthquake”
elections or plus ça change?
The open nature of the Irish economy, allied to the weak
financial regulation of banking institutions and an ill-
advised expansion in public spending on the part of the
Fianna Fail-led government in the lead up to the 2007
General Election, left it especially vulnerable to the global
economic downturn (Leahy, 2011). Following on the “Celtic
Table 1
Political party/grouping support levels in the Republic of Ireland at general, local and European election contests between 2007 and 2014a.
Party/Grouping General
election 2007
Local
elections 2009
European
elections 2009
General
election 2011
Local
elections 2014
European
elections 2014
Fianna Fail 41.6% 25.4% 24.1% 17.4% 25.3% 22.3%
The Green Party 4.7% 2.4% 1.9% 1.8% 1.6% 4.9%
Progressive Democrats 2.7% e e e e e
Government parties, 2007e2011 49.0% 27.8% 26.0% 19.2% 26.9% 27.2%
Fine Gael 27.3% 32.2% 29.1% 36.1% 24.0% 22.3%
Labour Party 10.1% 14.7% 13.9% 19.4% 7.2% 5.3%
Government parties, 2011-PRESENT 37.4% 46.9% 43.0% 55.5% 31.2% 27.6%
Sinn Fein 6.9% 7.4% 11.2% 9.9% 15.3% 19.5%
People Before Profit 0.4% 0.6% e 1.0% 1.7% 1.4%
Anti-Austerity Alliance/Socialist Party 0.6% 0.9% 2.8% 1.2% 1.2% 1.8%
United Left e e e e 0.3% e
Workers Party 0.1% 0.1% e 0.1% 0.2% e
Direct Democracy Ireland e e e e 0.2% 1.5%
Eirígí e e e e 0.2% e
Fís Nua e e e e 0.1% 0.3%
Workers and Unemployed Action Group 0.3% 0.2% e 0.4% 0.1% e
Independents and other small parties 5.1% 16.3% 11.5% 12.7% 22.5% 20.7%
The bold values relate to the different sets of parties (and their combined support levels) that formed the government at different stages of the economic
crisis in the Republic of Ireland.
a The party support figures included in this table are based on an analysis by the author of national-level election results for the six electoral contests
referred to here.
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growth in the history of the state, this sudden reversal of
economic fortunes produced a number of political casu-
alties, initially focusing on the Fianna Fail-Green Party
coalition government. Government support losses took
place over two specific stages. The first phase occurred in
the autumn of 2008, immediately following on the onset of
the economic crisis, while the second phase focused on the
winter of 2010, when the intervention of a troika involving
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Union
(EU) and European Central Bank (ECB) was required to “bail
out” the Irish economy. The events of Winter 2010 would
take place just a few months before the general election of
2011, which resulted in dramatic seat losses for both of
these parties.
Some opinion polls in the summer and autumn of 2010
had estimated that the Labour Party was the most popular
political party in the state. Changing support trends
immediately in the wake of the IMF-EU-ECB bailout, as the
electorate moved from the “politics of anger” to the “poli-
tics of fear”, however resulted in a swing from the Labour
Party towards Fine Gael and also, to a lesser degree, Sinn
Fein, in the wake of a major victory for that party in the
Donegal South-West Dail by-election of November 2010. In
the final weeks of the campaign Fine Gael came very close
to winning the level of support required to command an
overall majority in Dail Eireann. A series of ill-advised
campaign promises made in the final week of the
campaign, however, saw Labour claw back a sufficient level
of support to prevent this. Helped by the vagaries of the
Proportional Representation by Single Transferable Vote
(PR-STV) electoral system, which were further exacerbated
by the highly fractured political landscape emerging in the
wake of the Fianna Fail collapse, the new Fine Gael-Labour
coalition government enjoyed the largest Dail majority
held by any government since the foundation of the state.
The two parties held 68.1% of all the seats in Dail Eireann,with Fine Gael accounting for two-thirds of these seat
numbers.
This election took place only a few months after the
IMF-EC-ECB bailout and resulted in a heavy defeat for the
two government parties (Table 1). Blamed for the economic
crisis and the resultant onset of austerity policies, Fianna
Fail lost close to half a million first preference votes be-
tween the 2007 and 2011 elections (471,235 votes, or 54.9%
of its 2007 vote), with its national share of the vote falling
from 41.6% to 17.4%. Fianna Fail had held 78 Dail seats after
the 2007 election, but the partywon 19 of the 165 Dail seats
being contested at the 2011 contest. (They also held a seat
in the Louth constituency due to the automatic re-election
of the Ceann Comhairle.) Large levels of support were lost
by the party across the state, but the Fianna Fail losses were
especially heightened in the Dublin region and amongst
urbanworking class communities. The Green Party was left
without any Dail representation (having won 6 seats in
2007).
The traditional “catch-all” basis to Fianna Fail support
meant that no one party gained from the collapse in its
support base. Some gains were made by independent
candidates, while gains were also made by a number of
smaller groupings on the left of the political spectrum,
including Sinn Fein and the different parties that formed
the short-lived United Left Alliance. Most of the seat gains
were made by the two largest opposition parties, Fine Gael
and Labour, however. The destination of Fianna Fail support
losses to its main rivals in the Dublin region tended to break
down along class lines, with Fianna Fail defectors in the
more middle class areas favouring Fine Gael, while de-
fectors in themoreworking class areas tended to favour the
Labour Party.
Fianna Fail's position as the largest party in the state,
based on general election results, was usurped for the first
time since the general election of September 1927. Having
been “the perennial runner-up of Irish politics” (Leahy,
Fig. 2. Voter turnout levels (%) by social areas in the Republic of Ireland at electoral contests between 2007 and 2014. The areas located within the urban grouping
include all of the areas/constituencies located within the Dublin region and the Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford City Council areas, as well as the con-
stituencies located within the immediate commuter hinterlands of these city areas. The rural areas grouping is comprised of all of the other areas/constituencies
located within the state. The Dublin middle class areas grouping is comprised of the 50% most affluent electoral divisions within the Dublin region, based on an
analysis of the 2011 Small Area Health Research Unit deprivation index (Kelly and Teljeur, 2013), while the Dublin working class areas grouping is comprised of
the 50% least affluent/most deprived electoral divisions within that region. The mean voter turnout statistics for the urban and rural areas are based on an
analysis by the author of official election results, by Dail/general election constituency and local election constituency for the 2007 General Election, 2009 Local
Elections, 2011 General Election and 2014 Local Elections. The Dublin middle class and Dublin working class election statistics are based on an analysis by the
author of marked register-based sub-constituency turnout levels for the same electoral contests. More details on the process of calculating these marked register
voter turnout figures are provided in Kavanagh (2002).
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party in the state, having already outpolled Fianna Fail at
the 2009 Local and European elections. Fine Gael com-
manded high levels of support amongst rural voters and
the urbanmiddle classes at the 2009 and 2011 contests, but
they did not farewell in themoreworking class urban areas
and, as such, did fully mirror the “catch-all” nature of the
old Fianna Fail support patterns. With the implosion of the
Fianna Fail support base in the more working class areas,
Labour now attracted the highest levels of support from
these areas.
There was a strong expectation that the extent of their
Dail majority would ensure the new government would go
on to enjoy a second term in office, but these expectations
were undermined by subsequent political developments.
The need to continue with the policies of austerity, as
required by the state of the national finances and by the
bailout agreement reached with the IMF, EU and ECB troika
in late 2010, brought about a notable decline in support
levels for these parties between 2011 and 2014, asmeasured in a series of national opinion polls. There were
admittedly some electoral successes during this period,
including a win for Labour's Michael D. Higgins at the 2011
Presidential Election (held a few months after the general
election) and a number of victories at Dail by-elections. The
first major electoral challenge for the coalition government
would, however, be the midterm 2014 Local and European
elections.
As at the 2013 Seanad Referendum, electoral participa-
tion levels played a role in shaping the results of the 2014
elections. Voter turnout levels at local and European elec-
tion contests in the Republic of Ireland had improved
notably in the 2004 (58.8%) and 2009 (57.7%) contests
relative to the low turnout (50.2%) 1999 elections. However,
the national turnout level fell back to 51.6% at the 2014
elections. The low turnout 1999 contest had been charac-
terised bywide rural-urban variations in turnout levels and
by exceptionally low participation levels in working class
urban areas, such as the Dublin Inner City and Clondalkin,
but these extremes were not as pronounced in 2014.
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middle class and working class areas narrowed signifi-
cantly when contrasted with previous electoral contests,
including the 2011 General Election (Fig. 2). With working
class areas now having a greater bearing on the election
results, this further fuelled the notable surge in support
levels for the more left-of-centre parties and candidates at
these contests.
By contrast, both Fine Gael and Labour lost large levels
of support (Table 1). The combined Fine Gael-Labour vote in
the European elections fell by 27.9% relative to the 2011
General Election. The relatively larger drop in rural and
middle class turnout levels suggests that a significant
chunk of the Fine Gael support base may have opted to
remain home on polling day, instead of supporting an
alternative party or grouping. By contrast, the smaller
decline inworking class turnout levels suggests that Labour
losses could not be attributed to voter abstentionism.
Instead, many of those who had supported Labour in 2009
and 2011 were now opting to support Sinn Fein and the
other left-wing parties, groupings and candidates.
Most media focus was on the losses suffered by the La-
bour Party, especially given that party leader and Tanaiste
(deputy prime minister), Eamonn Gilmore, resigned
immediately in the wake of the election results. Labour was
left without any representation at the European Parliament
level, havingwon three seats in 2009, while their number of
council seats fell by over sixty percent, despite the overall
increase in City and County Council seat numbers. Fine Gael
actually lost a larger number of votes and seats at the local
election contests than Labour did, but these results were
offset by a successful European Parliament campaign.
Further highlighting the vagaries of the PR-STV system, Fine
Gael's share of the European election vote fell by almost
seven percent between 2009 and 2014, but their overall
number of seats (four) remained the same, even though
Ireland now had one less seat in the European Parliament.
By contrast, Fianna Fail ended up winning just one seat
at the European contests, despite winning a slightly larger
number of votes than Fine Gael did. (To make matters
worse, less than a month after the election had taken place
Fianna Fail lost their only MEP, Brian Crowley, after he
unilaterally decided to leave the ALDE (Alliance of Liberals
and Democrats for Europe) grouping, which Fianna Fail is
aligned with, to join the ECR (European Conservative and
Reformist) grouping.) Fianna Fail woes at the European
level were offset by a strong performance at the City and
County Council elections. The large number of Fine Gael
council seat losses allowed Fianna Fail to reclaim its posi-
tion as the largest political party at the local authority level.
Fianna Fail's junior partner in the ill-fated 2007e2011
government, the Green Party, also fared relatively well in
these elections. Party leader, Eamonn Ryan, came close to
winning a European Parliament seat in the three-seat
Dublin constituency, while the Greens gained a number
of seats in the council elections, primarily in the more
middle class Dublin constituencies.
Candidates from the Independents and Others (smaller
parties) grouping accounted for the largest share of the
vote at both the local and European election contests. In
Ireland independent candidates generally fare better in thesmaller constituencies associated with local election con-
tests, mainly due to their highly localised support patterns,
but also because their financial and organisational re-
sources tend to be more limited than those available to
candidates for the larger political parties. The increased size
of local election constituencies at the 2014 contests, added
to a number of further changes to local election boundaries,
offered a significant challenge for independent candidates
at these contests. But these challenges were offset by a
swing towards the Independents and Others grouping in
the months leading up to the elections. The gains made by
the Independent and Others grouping were overshadowed
by those made by Sinn Fein, however. Sinn Fein trebled
their number of council seats and they gained a seat in each
of the three European Parliament constituencies.
Sinn Fein fared especially well in terms of selecting e
and electing e younger and female candidates at these
elections. Indeed these elections marked some limited
degree of progress in relation to female electoral partici-
pation levels in the Republic of Ireland ahead of the intro-
duction of a gender quota at the next general election.
Females had accounted for only one sixth (16.6%) of the
successful candidates at the 2009 City and County Council
elections, but the level of successful female candidates
increased to 20.7% at the 2014 contests, admittedly still a
very low level of representation by European standards. By
contrast, more females (six) than males (five) won seats at
the European Parliament elections, the first time that fe-
male candidates have been more successful at a general,
local or European election contest in the history of the
state. A record level of female candidates had won seats at
the 2011 General Election, although this level (25 female
Dail deputies, or 15.1% of the total) pales in comparison
with the higher levels found in most other democracies.
The introduction of a gender quota at the next general
election has been designed to address such concerns.
Should this initiative prove to be successful, this will
further fuel the high levels of turnover associated with
representative politics during the era of austerity.
High levels of electoral volatility are by no means a new
feature of the Irish political landscape, but the extent of the
changes experienced in the past seven years have been
unparalleled throughout the history of the state. The
changing support trends associated with the electoral
contests that followed the economic “crash” of 2008 does
support the claim that these were indeed “earthquake
elections”, marking a fundamental break from the normal
pattern of party competition in the Republic of Ireland.
The three parties that formed the bulwark of the “two
and a half party” political system over the previous century
have all experienced dramatic support losses at different
stages over the past seven years. This may mark a signifi-
cant realignment of Irish party politics, or else it may prove
to be a temporary reversal in these parties' electoral for-
tunes driven by very extreme economic circumstances.
However, the changes in the socio-economic bases of party
support in Ireland across this period, triggered initially by
the dramatic loss in Fianna Fail support, may prove to be
the most significant legacy of this particular period in Irish
politics. The changing geographic and class bases to polit-
ical support patterns perhaps offers the most potent
Table 2
Support levels for political parties by social area in the Republic of Ireland
at general and local election contests between 2007 and 2014a.
Party/Grouping Rural Urban Dublin e
Middle class
Dublin e
Working class
Fianna Fail
2007 General Election 42.3% 40.2% 38.7% 38.2%
2009 Local Elections 28.5% 17.3% 18.9% 14.9%
2011 General Election 19.0% 14.8% 13.7% 10.8%
2014 Local Elections 29.3% 19.5% 18.5% 11.6%
Fine Gael
2007 General Election 30.2% 22.5% 22.9% 13.0%
2009 Local Elections 35.2% 24.4% 30.4% 14.7%
2011 General Election 38.4% 32.2% 37.8% 19.6%
2014 Local Elections 27.1% 19.5% 25.0% 8.9%
Labour Party
2007 General Election 8.6% 12.7% 14.0% 16.5%
2009 Local Elections 10.9% 24.7% 23.7% 27.8%
2011 General Election 15.7% 26.0% 24.6% 34.2%
2014 Local Elections 5.1% 10.2% 12.8% 10.8%
Sinn Fein
2007 General Election 7.2% 6.4% 2.7% 13.0%
2009 Local Elections 6.9% 8.6% 3.3% 16.9%
2011 General Election 10.7% 8.6% 3.3% 15.5%
2014 Local Elections 13.5% 17.9% 9.6% 30.6%
Green Party
2007 General Election 3.5% 6.8% 9.4% 6.1%
2009 Local Elections 1.6% 4.3% 5.8% 3.6%
2011 General Election 1.3% 2.8% 4.8% 2.3%
2014 Local Elections 0.5% 3.2% 6.9% 4.6%
a The areas located within the urban, rural, Dublin middle class and
Dublin working class groupings are the same as those listed as being
assigned to these areas in the details provided for Fig. 2. The election
statistics listed here for the urban and rural areas are based on an analysis
by the author of official election results, by Dail/general election constit-
uency and local election constituency for the 2007 General Election, 2009
Local Elections, 2011 General Election and 2014 Local Elections, while the
Dublin middle class and Dublin working class election statistics are based
on an analysis by the author of tally figures (sub-constituency support
levels) for the same electoral contests.
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taking, as will be discussed in the next section.
4. Changing class bases of party support during the
era of austerity?
The rapid fluctuations in political support levels at the
national level have been underpinned by even dramatic
shifts by geographic area and by class group, as illustrated
by Table 2. Most of these changeswere largely driven by the
collapse in Fianna Fail support levels. The “catch-all” nature
of Fianna Fail support patterns had effectively acted as a
dampener on the development of a significant class basis to
Irish politics for much of the state's history, with this sup-
port pattern also evident at the 2007 General Election.
Fianna Fail support levels would fall by a level of between
twenty and thirty percent in practically all areas within the
state between the 2007 and 2011 contests, but their sup-
port levels fell to especially low levels in working class
urban areas. While the party reclaimed some of its lost
support in rural and middle class urban areas at the 2014
elections, little recovery was evident in these working class
urban areas. This also proved to be the case with the
October 2014 Dail by-election in the largely working class
Dublin South-West constituency, where Fianna Fail recor-
ded its lowest ever vote share in a Dail by-election contest
(8.6%). The sharpening of the class-basis to Fianna Fail
support patterns was mirrored in Fine Gael support trends
over the same time period, with that party also becoming
increasingly reliant on rural andmiddle class urban areas to
maintain its support levels following the 2011 election.
Labour had initially succeeded in replacing Fianna Fail
as the strongest party in working class urban areas, but the
Labour gains in working class Dublin quickly evaporated
after that party entered government in 2011. Relatively few
of the Fianna Fail working class defectors, who had sup-
ported Labour in 2009 and 2011, returned to Fianna Fail at
the 2014 elections, however, and Sinn Fein instead proved
to the main destination for such voters at these contests.
Sinn Fein now replaced Labour as the largest party on the
left of the political spectrum and the party also made major
gains outside its Border and urban working class heart-
lands. Sinn Feinwon seats in some of the more middle class
Dublin local election constituencies, although they were
helped to a large degree by the increase in district magni-
tude levels for these contests. While Sinn Fein support
levels in middle class urban areas still remained low rela-
tive to other parts of the state, the party won close to ten
percent of the vote, on average, in these areas at the 2014
Local Elections. This marked a considerable improvement
in the party's electoral fortunes in these areas when
compared with previous electoral contests.
Increased support levels in its urban middle class
heartlands provided a firm basis for a Green Party recovery
in 2014, following its traumatic period in government with
Fianna Fail. Labour also won a higher level of support
amongst middle class Dublin voters, who were attracted to
the party on the basis of its liberal position on social issues,
than its did amongst the urban working classes. A similar
trendwas also evidencedwhen Labour support levels fell in
the 1980s during an earlier period in government with FineGael. But during the 1980s the party maintained a solid
support base in rural constituencies, associated with per-
sonal votes for long-standing Dail deputies, and this
ensured that the party maintained representation levels in
Dail Eireann during this period. Labour can no longer rely
on a loyal rural support base in the 2000s, however, given
the increasingly urban-focus of the party following its
merger with Democratic Left in 1999. Labour support levels
fell in some rural constituencies after this merger at the
same time as its support levels in Dublin were increasing.
The collapse in Fianna Fail support did lead to a spike in
Labour support levels in some rural constituencies at the
2009 and 2011 elections, but this new support rapidly
faded away after the party's entry into government.
The erosion of Labour's different support bases left its
support levels, as measured in recent opinion polls, hov-
ering at a level that would leave it with only a handful of
seats, or even no seats at all (Kavanagh, 2014b), in the next
Dail, if these support levels were replicated at the next
general election. The Sunday Times-Behaviour & Attitudes
poll of 16 August 2014 did note a surge in Labour support
levels (increasing to 14%) following the replacement of
party leader, Gilmore, by deputy party leader and Minister
for Social Protection, Joan Burton. But this “Burton Bounce”
was not sustained and subsequent polls showed that the
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modest increase of, at most, two or three percentage points.
By the final fewmonths of 2014 Labour's support levels had
declined once again and stood at especially low levels
(falling to as low as 5%) in the final three opinion polls of
that year (Kavanagh, 2014b).
Labour's struggles may well create the context in which
the final stages in the history of Civil War politics in Ireland
are played out. If Labour is not a viable option as a coalition
partner after the next general election, the two “Civil War
parties” may be forced into forming a coalition govern-
ment, especially given that neither party appears willing to
enter into a coalition government with Sinn Fein in the
present political climate.
The level of influence enjoyed by the “established”
parties (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour) in past electoral
contests has largely evaporated in the more working class
urban areas, where the most dramatic changes in political
support patterns in the past seven years have been recor-
ded. The combined level of support won by these parties in
working class Dublin areas amounted to little more than
thirty percent of the vote at the 2014 elections; an almost
identical level of support to that won by Sinn Fein. At the
Dail by-election in Dublin South-West in October 2014, the
combined support level won by these parties only
accounted for 25.9% of the first preference vote, in stark
contrast to the support levels won by the Sinn Fein (30.3%)
or the Anti Austerity Alliance/Socialist Party (27.2%) can-
didates. The combined support levels for the parties in the
Sunday Independent-Millward Brown opinion poll of 21st
December 2014 stood at just 45% (Kavanagh, 2014b), con-
trasting starkly with the very high support levels enjoyed
by these parties in previous decades and particularly dur-
ing the 1965e1982 period (Fig. 1).
The degree of volatility in Dublin during the period of
austerity politics has tended to increase in line with the
level of working class populations in an area, while the
established parties have fared better in areas with higher
levels of middle class populations (Fig. 3). Although it had
already commanded a relatively large level of support in
such areas prior to this period, the greatest swing towards
Sinn Fein over the 2007e14 period took place in the 20%
least affluent/most deprived electoral divisions in Dublin.
The size of the swing to Sinn Fein from the three larger
parties, in turn, declined in line with increasing levels of
affluence. But the aforementioned Dublin South-West Dail
by-election has shown that political allegiances in working
class urban areas are still highly fluid and that Sinn Fein
dominance of working class urban areas is by no means
guaranteed. Most commentators had expected Sinn Fein to
comfortably win this contest. However, despite winning a
higher number of first preference votes, Sinn Fein lost this
contest to the Anti Austerity Alliance/Socialist Party
candidate, Paul Murphy.
If Sinn Fein was to move close to the political centre in
order to better position itself to form part of a future coa-
lition government, its urban working class support base
could prove to be equally as vulnerable, as Labour and
Fianna Fail's were, to challenges from parties and groupings
located further to the left on the political spectrum. At
present, however, the potential for these parties to pose astrong challenge to Sinn Fein for the urban working class
vote is severely limited by the highly fragmented nature of
this political grouping. (However media reports early in
January 2015 suggest that an alliance, similar in scope to
the United Left Alliance of the 2011 election, may be formed
between the Socialist Party, People Before Profit Alliance
and other groupings ahead of the next general election
(McGee, 2015).) Mindful of the threat posed by these
groupings, Sinn Fein took a notably stronger oppositional
stance in the months following the Dublin South-West Dail
by-election and assumed a more prominent role in the
anti-water charge protest movement during the winter of
2014.
Support patterns in other parts of the state have proven
to be less volatile, but especially in the more rural areas.
Politics in rural Ireland still remains to be very much
dominated by Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, with these parties
commanding close to sixty percent of all rural votes in the
most recent general and local election contests. Further-
more, a significant chunk of the rural support for inde-
pendent candidates is accounted for by Fianna Fail or Fine
Gael “gene pool” independents (former Fianna Fail and Fine
Gael party members). However, results in some rural con-
stituencies at the 2011 General Election and the 2014 Local
Elections showed a growing appetite in rural areas for a
more radical alternative. A good example of this was the
Roscommon-South Leitrim Dail by-election of October
2014, where radical independent candidate, Michael Fitz-
maurice, won the contest by a comfortable margin over his
closest rival (the Fianna Fail candidate).
A political vacuum has been created in the Republic of
Ireland by the collapse in Fianna Fail support levels be-
tween 2008 and 2011 and the subsequent decline in sup-
port for the new government parties, Fine Gael and Labour.
A “new politics” is emerging out of this vacuum, which has
been defined to date by growing support levels for Sinn
Fein, as well as for independent candidates and other,
mainly left-of-centre, smaller parties. In recent months,
this “new politics” has seen the emergence of a range of
new political groupings within the Republic of Ireland,
including the aforementioned proposed new alliance be-
tween different groupings on the left of the political spec-
trum. In January 2015, the creation of a new centre-right
political party, led by former Fine Gael junior minister,
Lucinda Creighton, was announced. At this stage different
alliances of independent politicians are in the process of
being formed, with these involving a number of indepen-
dent Dail deputies, such as Shane Ross and John Halligan, as
well as Michael Fitzmaurice, the winner of the
Roscommon-South Leitrim by-election.
As this discussion has shown, the changing support
trends associated with this “new politics” have been
heavily controlled by both class and geography, with the
most significant changes in political allegiances occurring
in urban working class areas. However, as the effects of
austerity policies continue to be felt in the Republic of
Ireland and as opposition to proposed new taxes, such as
the contentious proposal to introduce water charges,
mounts, the appetite for more radical alternatives to the
political establishment continues to grow in all parts of the
state. A swift return to the old certainties of the “two and a
-30.0% -20.0% -10.0% 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0%
Fianna Fail
Fine Gael
Labour Party
Sinn Fein
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Fig. 3. Shifts in party support levels (%) by social area in Dublin between the 2007 and 2014 elections. Party support levels are calculated based on an analysis by
the author of tally figures (sub-constituency support levels) for the 2007 General Election and the 2014 Local and European elections for the Dublin region. The
Rank 1, Rank 2, Rank 3, Rank 4 and Rank 5 social areas are identified based on an analysis of the 2011 Small Area Health Research Unit (SAHRU) Deprivation Index
figures (Kelly and Teljeur, 2013) for the 322 electoral divisions in the Dublin region. This index is based on an analysis of deprivation-related variables in the 2011
Census in the Republic of Ireland. The Rank 1 areas are defined as being the 20% most affluent electoral divisions in Dublin based on an analysis of the 2011
SAHRU Deprivation index, while the Rank 2 areas are the 20% next most affluent electoral divisions… and the Rank 5 areas are the 20% most deprived electoral
divisions in the Dublin region.
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present political climate.
5. Concluding comments
The nature of political change in the Republic of Ireland,
during the period of the European debt crisis, has mirrored
trends in the rest of Europe to some extent, but some as-
pects appear to be largely unique to the Irish context.
Support levels for government parties in most other Eu-
ropean states, for instance, declined at the May 2014 Eu-
ropean and regional elections, as predicted by the second
order election model (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). But the
destination of government party support losses has tended
to be different in other western European states, such as
France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark
and Sweden. Populist or extreme right-wing parties, such
as the United Kingdom Independence Party and the Front
National in France, have made the most significant gains in
a number of these states, with these parties often drawing
on large levels of support from working class voters. This
blurring of the classic left-right political divide in many
European states comes at a point in time when the old CivilWar divide in Ireland, which defined politics for most of the
state's history, is being eroded. In Ireland, left-wing parties
and candidates have proven to be the main beneficiaries of
the political vacuum that has emerged during the era of
austerity politics. Thus, just when the Irish party system
finally appears likely to resemble the traditional European
class cleavage model, it could be argued that this same
model is being undermined in other European states by the
growing strength of populist right-wing parties and
groupings.
The rise of populist right-wing groupings tends, how-
ever, to be more of a characteristic of the core, or more
economically advanced, European countries. By contrast, in
the more peripheral European countries new left-wing
political parties or groupings, such as Syriza in Greece,
Podemos in Spain and the Five Star Movement in Italy, have
achieved very large levels of support in very short periods
of time during the past few years of austerity politics. Thus,
with the notable swing towards left-wing parties over the
past seven years, it could be argued that the pattern of
politics in the Republic of Ireland is now starting to
resemble that of the other countries in the European
periphery.
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most of the state's history have been the main casualties of
the rapidly shifting political landscape of post-crash
Ireland. The specific manner in which the Irish public has
responded to the economic crisis perhaps explains why
political fortunes have fluctuated to such a degree since
2008. There have been protests in Ireland during this
period and a series of demonstrations in the final few
months of 2014 were sparked by opposition to the pro-
posed introduction of water charges. However, the level of
violent protests associated with other European states,
such as Greece, has not been as evident in Ireland. The Irish
electorate have, instead, largely preferred to “wait in the
long grass” and use electoral means to express their anger
with governmentmismanagement and austerity politics. In
short, the Irish have chosen to do their rioting through the
ballot box. In doing so, they may have fundamentally
shifted the political equilibrium of the Irish political sys-
tem, moving this from a system dominated by the old Civil
War cleavage to one that is coming more into line with the
traditional style of European party politics, at a time when
that class cleavage is coming under threat from the rise of
populist right-wing parties in the core states of the Euro-
pean Union.
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